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Abstract: This article solves and characterises optimal decision rules to invest in 
irreversible land improvements conditional on land tenure insecurity. The economic 
model is a normative dynamic programming model with known parameters for the 
single period returns and transition equations. The decision rules are solved 
numerically, conditional on alternative scenarios on the likelihood that the lease 
contract and, thus, farmer access to land is either renewed or expired. The model 
parameters represent Finnish soil quality and production conditions. The results 
suggest that irreversible land improvements decrease quickly and the yields decline 
gradually when the farmer is confronted with land tenure insecurity caused by 
uncertain renewal of the lease contract.  
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1. Introduction  
Economic literature analysing implications of land tenure insecurity focuses for the most part 
on developing countries. In these countries, land tenure insecurity has large implications, not 
only for land improvement, but also on the household and on society welfare as a whole. In 
many empirical studies, the effects of land tenure insecurity could not, however, be strongly 
identified in these countries, because household access to farming inputs and output markets 
can be severely retarded by other institutional, financial and economic factors than by land 
tenure insecurity alone (Holden and Hailu 2002).  
In the context of richer countries, land tenure insecurity has not received much attention 
in economics literature. Even if land tenure insecurity is not yet a dominating problem in these 
countries, it may become such, particularly in Less Favoured Areas (LFA), where production 
costs are high and yields are low. The trend towards more liberalised food market and 
internationally harmonised agricultural policies decrease Marginal Value Products (MVP) for 
agricultural inputs in the LFA areas, where farmer options to adjust to these trends are rare. 
There are good reasons to expect that, in the LFA areas of Northern Europe, land 
improvements may decrease below the socially optimal levels1, if farmers are confronted with 
significant land tenure insecurity.  
In Finland, for example, signals on market failures, caused by land tenure insecurity, are 
emerging in the agricultural input market and in the amount of irreversible land improvements. 
Land improvements have generally decreased, and they have decreased most in land parcels 
which have been cultivated under lease contracts (Yearbook of Farm Statistics 2003; Myyrä et 
                                                          
1
  The socially optimal level of land improvements refers to a level, which is reached in 
competitive markets equilibrium without land tenure insecurity (Mas-Coell et.al. 1995 pp. 
325-328). The social optimum gives the maximum welfare for society as a whole, including 
land owners and tenants.  
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al. 2003). The observed data suggest that market failures resulting from the land insecurity 
problem have not been solved on land cultivated under lease contracts. The problem is not 
linked only to yields and food supply but also to efficiency of agri-environmental programs 
which require irreversible investments on land improvements that have long-payback periods. 
The potential land tenure insecurity problem on leased land is becoming more and more 
extensive. In 1995 in Finland, the share of land cultivated under a lease contract was 18% and 
by 2003, it was 33%.  
This article aims to solve and characterise optimal decision rules to invest in irreversible 
land improvements conditional on land tenure insecurity. The economic model is a normative 
dynamic programming model with known parameters for the single period returns and 
transition equations. The decision rules are solved numerically conditional on alternative 
scenarios on the likelihood that the lease contract and, thus, farmer access to land is expired. 
The model parameters represent Finnish conditions and they are based on field experiments. 
The results suggest that land improvements decrease quickly and the yields decline gradually 
when the continuation of the lease contract is uncertain.  
 
2. The model 
The Bellman equation  
The grain grower optimisation problem is modelled as a recursive finite horizon (T) dynamic 
programming problem that is solved numerically by iterating on the following Bellman’s 
equation (Bellman 1957): 
 (1) [ ]{ } ,...,T,t,(zVE,u(zR)(zV tttttttutt t 10))max 11 =+= ++  
subject to  
transition equations: ),g(1 ttt uzz =+ , and 
initial state: z0 given  
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where the optimal value function (Vt) is the function of the current state vector (zt); ut is the 
control (also called as the decision rule or policy function); Rt(.) is the single period net 
return function;  is the discount factor; and Et[.] is the conditional expectations operator, 
conditioned on current information (t). The optimal value function is constrained by the 
transition equations, in which g(.) is a function. It determines the connection between the 
current state and control and the next period state. The optimal solution is pinned down by 
the initial state z0. It has to be noticed that zt and ut have separate transition equations and 
contributions to the net return. This specification generalises the models presented in 
Kennedy (1986). 
The problem is normalised to one hectare and the crop grown is spring barley which is 
the most common cereal grown in Finland. The soil types are fine-textured Vertic 
Cryaquepts2 and medium-textured Oxyaquic Eutrocryepts3. The model represents land that 
has sufficient quality and the long-run equilibrium is to keep soil pH and soil phosphorus 
status at satisfactory4 levels from society’s perspective, i.e. without land tenure insecurity. In 
more marginal land areas, the land tenure insecurity problem is not the only institutional 
factor which is decreasing irreversible soil improvements in a high cost country with sparse 
rural population, such as Finland.  
 The problem is specified and solved separately for phosphorus and lime applications. 
The time horizon was set at 100 years which guaranteed that not only decision rules but also 
stock variables converged.  
                                                          
2
  Soil taxonomy 
3
  Soil taxonomy 
4
  The values of pH and soil phosphorus status are divided into seven classes as follows: poor, 
rather poor, fair, satisfactory, good, high and excessive (Viljavuuspalvelu Oy – Soil Analysis 
Service Ltd. 2000). The class limits are based on extensive number of field experiments. The 
target class, considered sufficient for normal yields of field crops such as cereals and ley, is 
satisfactory. Phosphorus is extracted with an acid (pH 4.65) ammonium acetate solution, 
closely resembling the well-known Morgan method, and soil pH is determined in water 
suspension. 
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Economic implications of land tenure insecurity are modelled through a sequence of 
fixed duration () land leasing contracts. We simulate a five-year () cash lease contract, 
which is the standard duration for the lease contracts in Finland. Five-year contracts and 
commitments are often required in agri-environmental programs. Contracts over 10 years are 
forbidden by Finnish law (Maanvuokralaki). The most common lease payment is a fixed cash 
payment, since the land owners can auction the cash payments with low information 
requirements. The short-term land rent can be maximised simply by leasing the land for a 
farmer who pays the highest cash lease.  
The signed contract continues and farmer has certain access to land until the contract’s 
next expiry date 	
 for n=1,2,3,…,20. At each expiry date t=n, the continuation of the 
contract is uncertain and it is renewed by an exogenously given probability Probn . Because 
continuation and expiry are mutually exclusive, the probability that the lease contract expires 
is (1-Prob ) and, once the contract expires, the single period returns are assumed to stay at 
zero forever. Thus, the expiry is assumed irreversible so that, if the contract expires, it can 
never be renewed. Under these conditions, taking the expectations results in the Bellman 
equation  
(2)  { } ,...,T,t,)(zVProb),u(zR)(zV ttttttutt t 10max 11 =+= ++   
  subject to  ),g(1 ttt uzz =+   
z0 given , T=100 
  where 0Probt 1 for all 	, and Probt=1 otherwise. 
 
The state vector (zt) consists of nutrient stock (xt) and prices of outputs (pt) and the 
price of the control variable (wt). Prices are assumed deterministic such that the current prices 
prevail in the future. Thus, the transition equations for prices are simply  
(3) wwwandppp tttt ==== ++ 11  
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The transition equations (i.e. the carry-over effects) for phosphorus and soil pH are defined 
separately in subsequent sections.  
The single period net return (Rt) is the difference between the single period revenue 
from selling the yield minus the expenditure of purchasing the control. Because other factors 
are hold-fixed in the analysis, they can be suppressed and the single period return function is: 
(4)  tttttttt uwuxypuzR −= ),(),(  
where y(xt,ut) is a deterministic yield response function, specified separately for phosphorus 
and lime below. The last term, wtut is the expenditure of using inputs i.e. lime and 
phosphorus fertiliser. 
Phosphorus (P): yield response and carry-over 
The yield (y) and phosphorus control (up) are expressed as kilograms per hectare (kg/ha), 
whereas the phosphorus stock (xp) is expressed by milligrams of easily soluble phosphorus 
per litre of soil (mg/l). 
Phosphorus has a direct flow effect and an indirect stock effect on the yield. The direct 
flow effect is the fraction of the current phosphorus fertilisation that is utilised by the crop at 
the same period as the nutrient is applied in soil. Indirect stock effect is from phosphorus 
stock accumulated in soil as unused residues of previous phosphorus applications. It can be 
depleted gradually without phosphorus fertilisation, reflected as a decline of the soil test P 
value. It is common that 10%-25% phosphorus taken up by a crop comes from the same 
year’s fertiliser application, the rest originating from the stock of the soil build up earlier 
(Sharpley 1986). The yield response to the phosphorus stock in the soil is described by a 
Mitscherlich function (Myyrä et al. 2003) 
(5)  ptxptpt euxy 37.024923367),( −−=  
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and the yield response to phosphorus application (up) is specified as an exponential function 
(Saarela et al. 1995): 
(6)  p
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The transition equation is assumed to be 
(7) ptptpt xux )02.01(01.01 −+=+   
The transition equation imposes an average annual decay rate of 2% in the stock of 
phosphorus, which can be seen when upt is put to zero. The assumption is made, even if it is 
known that the decay rate has a large annual variation (Yli-Halla 1989). The initial state for 
the stock is given as lmgx p /8.70 = , which was estimated to be an average on leased plots in 
central and northern Finland (Myyrä et al. 2003). 
The fit of the equation system matches to the generalised results of Mäntylahti (2002) 
so that an annual phosphorus application of 14-15 kg/ha converges the phosphorus stock at 
around 7.5 mg/l. Less than 15 kg/ha phosphorus application is a common standard in meeting 
the terms of the Finnish agri-environmental program. The resulting average yield level is 
3,500 kg/ha, which also corresponds to the observed average yields of spring barley in 
Finland (Yearbook of Farm Statistics 2003).  
Lime (L): yield response and carry-over 
The liming control (ul) is measured as tonnes per hectare (t/ha) and the stock of lime (xl) is 
measured in terms of soil pH. Liming has only an indirect effect on yield via soil pH. The 
yield response to the soil pH is described by Mitscherlich function (Kempainen 1993; Myyrä 
et al. 2003) 
(8)  tpHltlt euxy 85.3291478623748),( −−=  
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The transition equation describing the carry over effect and the effects of liming to the soil 
pH is (Kemppainen 1993) 
(9) 015.0049.011 −+== ++ tlttlt pHupHx   
With no liming, the average annual decay rate in the soil pH is 0.015 pH-units, which implies 
that annual amount of liming required for maintaining the existing pH level is on average 0.3 
tonnes per hectare. The initial state is imposed at 8.500 == pHxl , which was estimated to be 
an average on leased plots in central and northern parts of Finland (Myyrä et al. 2003). The 
prices and the scope of the model are summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1. Prices and the scope of the optimisation problem.  
Price of barley a 
Price of phosphorus a 
Price of lime a 
 if applied 1-3 tonnes/ha 
 if applied 4-15 tonnes/ha 
Discount factor () 
Time horizon (T) 
Duration of single contract () 
110 /tonne 
1,220 /tonne 
 
42.69 /tonne 
33.61 /tonne 
1/1.05 
100 years 
5 years 
 
a
  The prices are farm gate ones. The price of liming includes also distribution on the field 
because the standard is that the distribution is bought from a contractor and therefore 
does not involve sunk cost from the farmer perspective. Distribution incurs extra cost per 
tonne at low application levels.  
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3. Results 
Phosphorus 
When there is no land tenure insecurity, i.e. where the land is owned by the farmer or the 
lease contract is repeatedly renewed with certainty, the steady state equilibrium5 for the 
phosphorus application is estimated to be 18 kg/ha (Figure 1). The likelihood for expiry of 
the lease contract has considerable effects on the optimal phosphorus fertilisation, 
particularly, when the contract is reaching the edge of expiry/renewal date. If, for example, 
the odds are slightly in favour of contract renewal (Prob=0.6), the optimal phosphorus 
fertilisation stays between 10 and 11 kg/ha until the third year before the renewal date. This 
level of application is as much as 39% - 44% lower than the long-run equilibrium without 
land tenure insecurity. Thereafter and towards the end of the current contract, the phosphorus 
fertilisation drops to 8-9 kg per hectare. If the expiry of the contract is certain, the 
phosphorus fertilisation goes towards 2 kg/ha quickly as the expiry date approaches. 
                                                          
5
 Which we call as the socially optimal level in chapter 1. 
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Figure 1. Phosphorus fertilisation (upt) (left diagram) and consequent values of easily soluble 
P in soil (right diagram) as a function of the remaining duration in the contract 
before its expiry/renewal date, conditional on the probability (Prob) that the 
contract is renewed at the expiry date. If Prob=1 (Prob=0), the contract is certain 
to be renewed (terminated). Please note that the phosphorus state (zt) is not yet 
converged by the period of t=5. The crop is spring barley. 
 
When there is no land tenure insecurity the steady state (i.e. the state which you have to 
keep to achieve the maximum profit) for soil phosphorus is 8.5 mg/l, which is substantially 
below the amount needed for producing the maximum yield (13 mg/l)(Figure 2). If 
uncertainty over the continuation of each five-year contract is high so that the odds are 
strongly against of contract renewal (Prob=0.2), the steady state soil phosphorus is estimated 
at 5.5 mg/l, which definitely represents a lower soil phosphorus status that required for the 
maximum yield. Even if the odds are slightly in favour of the contract renewal (Prob=0.6), 
the steady state soil phosphorus decreases to 6.8 mg/l. The analysis is based on the estimated6 
connection between soil phosphorus and expected yield presented in equation 5. In equation 
5, decreasing soil phosphorus has quite a small influence to yield until the soil phosphorus 
                                                          
6
  Functional form is a fundamental question in estimating the connection between fertilisation 
and yield (Bäckman et al., 1997). A thorough discussion about the functional specification 
can be found in Myyrä et al., (2003).  
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decreases below 7 mg/l. When the soil phosphorus status declines below 7 mg/l, the yield 
decreases rapidly. Thus, the profit maximising soil phosphorus levels are substantially lower 
compared to the maximum yield levels under high uncertainty over contract renewal (Prob< 
0.4).  
When the phosphorus state is converged, the steady state equilibrium for the 
phosphorus application is estimated between 16 and 18 kg/ha (Figure 2). The optimal use of 
phosphorus fertiliser has decreased slightly, because of increased phosphorus stock. Changes, 
caused by uncertainty, in phosphorus stock have also implications to the tenants fertilising 
behaviour. There is incentive to use phosphorus fertiliser at the beginning of the lease 
contracts, even if uncertainty over continuation of each five-year contract is high (Prob=0.2), 
because of the low levels of phosphorus stock. Incentives disappear sharply as the expiry 
date approaches (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Phosphorus fertilisation (upt) (left diagram) as a function of the remaining duration 
in the contract before its expiry/renewal date and converged values of easily 
soluble P in soil (right diagram) , conditional on the probability (Prob) that the 
contract is renewed at the expiry date. If Prob=1 (Prob=0), the contract is certain 
to be renewed (terminated). The phosphorus state (zt) is converged during 46 ≤ t ≤ 
50. The crop is spring barley. 
 
Gradually decreasing soil phosphorus stock will eventually decrease yields (ceteris 
paribus). Figure 3 traces out the yields during two five-year contracts, which are located in 
the optimisation horizon at 1≤ t ≤5 and 46≤ t ≤50. In the latter period, the soil phosphorus has 
converged to steady state values as given in Figure 2. When the land has been cultivated 
under several subsequent five-year lease contracts and the likelihood for contract renewal has 
been repeatedly at stake, the yield will start to decrease significantly and converge to around 
3,100 kg/ha. The yield decrease from the 3,400 kg/ha steady state equilibrium without land 
tenure insecurity is 300 kg/ha and in relative terms 10 per cents. Even if the odds are slightly 
in favour of contract renewal (Prob=0.6) the steady state yield will be decreased by 100 
kg/ha (3%) to 3,300 kg/ha. 
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Figure 3.  The predicted yield response to optimal phosphorus fertilisation under alternative 
probabilities (Prob) for renewal of each five-year lease contract (ceteris paribus). 
The phosphorus state (zt) is converged during 46 ≤ t ≤ 50 (right). The crop is 
spring barley.  
 
Liming and soil pH 
Liming represents even a longer term land improvement than phosphorus fertilisation. 
Liming is also to some extent lumpy so that it is expensive to distribute small amounts of 
lime (see the price thresholds in Table 1). Therefore, if the initial soil pH is in biological 
target range, which is in our simulations 5.8, the land tenure insecurity does not make a 
difference in the optimal liming rules (Figure 4). It does not pay to distribute lime on land 
with pH level exceeding 5.8, except when the farmer access to land certainly continues, 
either through repeated contract renewals or land ownership. In this case the decision rule 
converges with optimal behaviour around long-run equilibrium without land tenure 
insecurity, which is also optimal for the society. We have analysed crop farming and more 
precisely spring barley. More demanding crops would likely benefit from higher pH values.  
But when the initial pH level decreases and soil acidity increases, decisions to lime 
diversify according to the uncertainty over continuation of the lease contract (Figure 4). If 
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the contract is certain to expire, it pays to lime at the beginning of a five-year contract only if 
the soil pH is below an extremely low value of 5.2. If the odds are slightly in favour of 
contract renewal (Prob=0.6) it pays to lime at the beginning of the five-year contract if the 
soil pH is below 5.6.  
4,6
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5,8
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6,2
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time
pH
Prob=1
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Figure 4. Development of soil pH in a sequence of 5 year lease contracts, conditional on 
alternative contract renewal probabilities (Prob). The upward sloping jumps in 
soil pH indicate points where lime is applied. Downward sloping line traces the 
soil pH, when lime is not applied.  
 
The steady state, long-run equilibrium, without land tenure insecurity is to maintain soil pH 
above 5.8, representing a “satisfactory” or “fair” soil pH status in the soil type studies. The 
level is in internationally compared quite low. When the likelihood for contract renewal is 
positive (e.g. Prob>0.5), it is still advantageous to maintain the soil pH above 5.6. Optimal 
timing is to apply liming immediately after the new contract is signed. Nevertheless, when 
the likelihood for contract renewal decreases and the odds are in favour of contract 
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termination (Prob<0.5), the soil pH is allowed to decrease below 5.4, which in soil studies 
most commonly represents the fertility class “rather poor”7. This is below the biological 
optimum for barley.  
Neglected liming results in gradually decreasing soil pH, which will eventually 
decrease yields (ceteris paribus). Figure 5 traces out patterns of consequent five-year 
contracts, which add up to a 100 year period. When the land has been cultivated under 
several subsequent five-year lease contracts and the likelihood for contract renewal has been 
repeatedly at stake, the yield will start to decrease significantly and converge to around 3,590 
kg/ha. The yield decrease from the 3,730 kg/ha steady state equilibrium without land tenure 
insecurity is 140 kg/ha and, in relative terms, 4 per cent. If the odds are slightly in favour of 
contract renewal (Prob=0.6) the steady state yield will be decreased only by 30 kg/ha (0.8%) 
to 3,700 kg/ha. 
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Figure 5. Predicted yield response to optimal liming under alternative probabilities (Prob) 
for a renewal of each five-year lease contract (ceteris paribus). The means are 
computed over the years t ≥ 18. 
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  The class limits depend on the particle size distribution and the organic matter content of 
the soil.  
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Conformity of the predicted yield in two separately calculated models is not complete 
(Figures 2 and 5). This is because of separate data sources for the yield response and carry-
over parameters. Still both models give signals that land tenure insecurity harms the goal to 
increase productivity in Finnish crop farming.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The results of our normative dynamic programming model, solved with known parameters, 
highlight that optimal decision rules on irreversible land improvements, with long pay-back 
periods, substantially diversify according to the extent of land tenure insecurity. Land 
improvements decrease below the optimum for society, when the likelihood for contract 
renewal decreases and the likelihood of having future access to land decreases. Therefore, the 
current tendency of gradually increasing the share of land cultivated under simple fixed 
duration cash lease contracts poses a problem in maintaining land improvements and soil 
fertility that are sufficient for maximising society’s welfare. This will finally turn into 
decreased yields and weakened supply for food. Furthermore, the incentive problem caused 
by land tenure insecurity will hamper the efficiency of environmental programs to decrease 
nutrient runoffs since the standard is such that implementing these programs require 
irreversible investments on land with long-payback periods.  
The results also raise justified concerns and reasons to expect that prominent land 
tenure insecurity is posing more severe problems to land improvements than currently 
revealed by the observed statistics on soil pH and the stock of phosphorus in soil (soil 
phosphorus status). In positive approaches, the insecurity problem has had statistically 
significant effects on the soil pH and soil phosphorus, but the diversification in the stock 
variables according to land tenure status (leased vs. owned) has, so far, been modest (Myyrä 
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et al. 2003). The modest differences found in the positive modelling may have been shrink 
by data censoring. For example, the time when the land has come to the rental market was 
unobserved in the statistical tests of Myyrä et al. (2003).  
Nevertheless, substantial implications, as suggested by our normative model, are 
supported by aggregate market behaviour even if this behaviour cannot, due to data 
limitations, be directly linked to individual plots of certain tenure status. The demand for 
lime and phosphorus fertilisers has been decreasing rapidly as the share of land cultivated 
under lease contracts has been increasing. It has to be noted, however, that market trends 
have been affected also by other institutional and economic factors, such as decreasing 
Marginal Value Product for lime and phosphorus.  
Our results hold only to cash lease contracts where the likelihood of contract renewal is 
exogenous. The results do not generalise for repeated dynamic games, in which the 
reputation effect has significant implications for optimal decision rules. Thus, our analysis 
does not account for the possibility that land improvements may be used to increase 
likelihood for contract renewal. 
One of the main goals of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is to increase 
productivity in agriculture. The results signal that reaching this goal may be seriously 
hampered by gradually increasing land leasing unless land tenure insecurity problem can be 
solved by better contract design.  
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